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Abstract 
Susu is a popular form of savings in most developing economies. It is practiced in different forms and under 
different names in both developing and developed countries. In spite of its contribution to the socio-economic 
development of both developing and developed countries, it remains under-researched. There is therefore the 
need for further research into this complex financial phenomenon. This paper thus, critically examines existing 
literature on Susu and other micro savings phenomenon. It shows that Susu is a complex and dynamic social 
phenomenon. In substance, it discovered that susu shares similarities with other micro savings schemes such as 
rotating savings and credit schemes, accumulating savings and credit associations as well as Christmas hampers 
and Christmas clubs in England and the United States respectively. It establishes that similar to other micro 
savings schemes, the object of Susu is to help rural, poor and low income earners meet their economic, social or 
communal needs. 
Keywords: Microfinance, Susu, Ghana, Informal Finance, Micro Savings, Rural Economies  
1. Introduction 
This paper examines susu collection (susu) as a microfinance activity in a broader context and distinguishes it 
from other micro savings schemes. It shows that susu is a complex and a dynamic social phenomenon. It 
establishes that susu is practiced in different forms and under different names in both developing and developed 
countries. In spite of its dynamism and contribution to the socio-economic development of both developing and 
developed countries, it remains under-researched. Thus there is the need for further research into this complex 
financial phenomenon.  
Susu is a micro savings mechanism where individual collectors pick up daily deposits from savers over an 
agreed period of time and return the accumulated savings minus one day’s deposit as fees (Aryeetey and Udry 
1995; Aryeetey 1994). As a social phenomenon, susu forms part of that section of the financial system 
unregulated by formal rules. Instead, it is regulated by social control measures inherent in the phenomenon itself. 
It is an example of a financial phenomenon found mostly in developing countries (Aryeetey and Udry 1995; 
Ardener 1964).  
1.1 Micro Savings in Ghana 
Micro savings in Ghana covers both susu and group savings schemes also known as susu associations. The group 
schemes usually operate in the form of rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) and accumulating 
savings and credit associations (ASCRAs) (Aryeetey and Udry 1995). Steel and Andah (2003), in their study of 
rural and microfinance regulation in Ghana, identified two additional types of susu savings schemes which they 
described as susu clubs and susu companies. Amongst existing micro savings schemes, susu is the most 
prominent and widely participated, by both low and middle income earners in Ghana. The collectors mobilise a 
great deal of savings albeit without being prudentially regulated by any governmental body (Steel and Andah 
2003). As a microfinance activity, micro savings form part of the financial component of informal economies. 
Portes, Castells & Benton (1989) refer to this as a phenomena unregulated by the institutions of society in a legal 
and social environment in which similar activities are regulated.  
Little (1957) also identified friendly societies including the susu of Yoruba origin. The aim of these societies was 
limited to mutual aid and benefit to its members. In Ghana, he observed that the Nanamei Akpee society 
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headquartered in Accra had over 400 members, most of whom were educated or semi-literate women traders. 
Members of this group paid monthly subscriptions for funeral expenses. Monies were also collected on a weekly 
basis and given to members, starting with the one whose name came first in the members’ book and continuing 
until everyone received their share (Little 1957). Subsequently, in the early 1960s, Little (1962) conducted 
another study where he observed the existence of societies and associations of various forms whose purpose was 
to help members save money or provide mutual benefit. Some of these associations based in Accra had existed 
for more than 30 years. These societies were not formed on tribal or religious lines and accepted all into their 
membership. Even though Little’s (1962) studies attempted to identify mutual aid groups and societies with 
some form of savings and credit facilities for their members, they were limited to group schemes of a formal 
nature. His studies lack data on informal savings schemes and provide no information on susu.  
Ardener (1964), Acquah (1958) and Ardener (1953) undertook some studies on informal savings and credit 
schemes. These studies, however, concentrated on group savings and credit schemes and contribution clubs, with 
no significant data on susu. For instance, Ardener (1964) dealt extensively with ROSCAs in India, West, Central, 
East and South Africa but only made reference to the existence of susu amongst the Ga, a tribal group in the then 
Gold Coast and said nothing more about it. It is unclear whether Ardener’s (1964) reference to susu in that 
context referred to susu per se or ROSCAs. Acquah (1958) also examined associations in Accra whose members 
contributed monies for their mutual benefit. Since then, the most substantial work on susu and other informal 
savings schemes have been produced by (Steel, Aryeetey, Hettige & Nissanke 1997; Aryeetey and Udry 1995; 
Aryeetey 1994; Steel and Aryeetey 1994). In most of their studies, both Steel and Aryeetey focused on 
microfinance generally, in Ghana and other developing countries. They provided detailed information on the role 
of microfinance, albeit with in-depth data on the credit side of the market to the neglect of the savings segment 
(Steel et al 1997; Aryeetey 1993).   
However, in 1994, Aryeetey examined the operations of susu collectors in Ghana. Nevertheless, his study was 
limited to a brief description of susu, with an even more brief account on why people pay to save with a susu 
collector. He observed that mobile bankers found in West Africa help market women through daily savings 
collection to accumulate capital for their businesses. Aryeetey (1994) explained that susu serve as a financial 
management service through which savers protect their savings from friends and family. There was, however, no 
in-depth data on the institutional framework of susu with empirical observation as he concentrated on the 
collectors themselves, their lending activities and their earnings. He also focused on the need to establish 
linkages with the banks to enable collectors to meet the demands for credit by their clients without evaluating the 
implications of forging such linkages. He failed to analyse the structural deficiencies of the scheme together with 
an analysis on why it works.   
 
1.1.1 Susu 
Susu has been part of Ghana’s micro financial system for at least three centuries (Williams 2006). It forms part 
of the financial phenomena occurring beyond the functional scope of countries’ banking and other financial 
sector regulations (Jones, Sakyi-Dawson, Hartford & Sey 2000; Aryeetey 1998). Strictly defined, susu is an 
informal savings mobilisation mechanism where individual savings collectors help savers accumulate savings 
through daily deposits in consideration of a day’s deposit. It involves a regular pickup of cash with unrestricted 
rights to withdraw it at a later date (Ashraf, Karlan & Yin 2005; Aryeetey and Udry 1995; Aryeetey 1994). Susu 
is commonly referred to as susu or esusu in West Africa where it is very popular (Alabi, Alabi & Ahiawodzi 
2007; Aryeetey and Udry 1995).  
Central to the susu system is the provision of saving schemes to depositors, purposely to help them accumulate 
their savings over periods ranging between one month and two years. Even though credit is not the main 
objective of susu, it is quite common for depositors to be advanced credit facilities (Steel and Andah 2003; 
Aryeetey 1994). In 1997, The World Bank’s report on informal financial markets and financial intermediation in 
four African countries observed that some susu collectors sometimes advanced monies to their clients before the 
end of the agreed period. (The World Bank Group 1997) 
Susu operates primarily on the savings side of the market and is based on a simple system devoid of bureaucratic 
procedures and complex documentation. It is operated by collectors who are mostly men operating from kiosks 
which are usually located in the markets. The collections are often of low but regular value and are usually kept 
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by the collector for each of his clients until the accumulated amount, minus one day’s collection, is returned to 
the depositor. Whilst some collectors hold onto savings collections for safe keeping, others deposit them in their 
bank accounts. Others still invest them in their businesses or lend them to others (Jones et al 2000; Aryeetey 
1994). 
 
1.1.2 Susu Clubs 
The concept of savings clubs have been examined in a number of studies in various forms (Buijs 1998; 
Duggleby, Aryeetey & Steel 992; Miracle, Miracle & Cohen 1980; Ardener 1964). An examination of these 
studies shows that the word ‘clubs’ has been used to describe group savings and credit associations such as 
ROSCAs and, in a few instances, susu. Steel and Andah (2003) however classified susu clubs as an entirely 
different type of susu. According to them, susu clubs have the characteristics of both susu savings and credit 
schemes. They suggested that members commit to save toward a sum that each member decides over a period 
ranging between a fifty and a hundred week cycle with an amount equal to 10% of each deposit paid as 
commission. An additional fee is charged where a member is advanced the total amount which he has committed 
to save earlier than agreed  
Aryeetey (1994) and The World Bank Group (1997), however, suggest that with the increased demand for 
financial support, some susu collectors introduced credit as part of their susu scheme, sometimes advancing 
credit to their clients before the end of the agreed saving period. This suggestion is corroborated by empirical 
evidence from Agomenya, where a wealthy susu collector who supplied groceries to traders in the market 
explained that, in addition to advancing loans to his trustworthy savers, he often supplied some of them with 
groceries and collected their daily sales in payment until the cost of the supplies are paid for. The introduction of 
this credit facility, in addition to the savings scheme, may have led to the belief by Steel and Andah (2003) that 
susu clubs are different types of susu schemes in Ghana. The only data on what Steel and Andah (2003) 
described as susu clubs is what they themselves provided in their study. Buijs (1998), Miracle et al (1980) and 
Ardener (1964), for instance, only used the description “club” as an alternative to associations in their study of 
informal savings and credit associations. The classification of susu clubs as types of susu schemes therefore 
raises doubts.  
The similarities between the alleged susu clubs and susu go to show that susu clubs do not in fact exist as a 
separate type of susu.  At best, it only shows the absence of uniformity in the operations of susu collectors. The 
non-existent of susu clubs as  separate susu schemes was made more apparent in Duggleby et al (1992) study of 
formal and micro finance for small enterprises in Ghana, when they used the description ‘susu clubs’ to refer to 
group saving schemes. In their words:    
“Dominant on the savings side were different versions of the susu system, while the operations of 
moneylenders dominated the lending side. The susu system of saving has two versions: rotating 
savings through susu clubs; and individual susu collectors who operate a deposit facility for any 
number of people. The second is believed to have developed out of the first”. 
                 (Duggleby et al 1992)  
Their description of the susu system reinforces the evidence that there are in fact only two main susu schemes in 
Ghana, that is; susu per se and susu associations. Gallardo (2002) hit the nail right on the head when he 
suggested that a susu club is another form of the susu system, where, rather than collectors going to depositors to 
pick up their savings, savers instead went to their collectors at a designated place to deposit their savings.   
 
1.1.3 Susu Companies 
Another misconception about the types of susu schemes in Ghana has been the classification of what Steel and 
Andah (2003) described as susu companies. This misconception may have resulted from the use of ascribed susu 
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methods by some companies who found the susu system attractive. These incorporated bodies providing 
financial services in the form of susu are, according to Steel and Andah (2003), susu companies constituting 
another type of susu scheme in Ghana. They suggested that some registered businesses joined the stream of susu 
scheme organisers in the late 1980s. As part of their scheme susu companies used susu techniques to collect 
daily savings from depositors with promises of loans almost twice the amount deposited after a minimum period 
of about six months (Steel and Andah 2003).  
Unfortunately, due to capital inadequacy, most of these companies were unable to fulfil their promises. Some 
companies were also alleged to have mismanaged depositors’ savings and soon became unsustainable which, in 
most cases, led to their collapse Steel & Andah (2003). Under the Non-Bank Financial Institutions Act, 2008 
(Act 774) and its predecessor the Financial Institutions (Non-Banking) Law, 1993 (PNDCL 328), the practice of 
giving out loans in such manners by businesses were brought under the regulatory regime and thus ceased to be 
an informal activity. These susu companies were therefore phased out as they were, by virtue of the law, illegal. 
Under the law, incorporated entities providing financial services were required to raise the requisite minimum 
capital and obtain the relevant licenses in order to operate, money-lending services and non-deposit-taking 
microfinance services among others (Non-Bank Financial Institutions Act, 2008 (Act 774). The schedule to the 
law specifically mentioned savings and loans companies as one of the institutions required to obtain the requisite 
licenses from the Bank of Ghana. Unfortunately, most of the susu companies could neither meet these 
requirements nor obtain the relevant licenses. It is worth noting that the Bank of Ghana has in recent times 
promulgated some regulatory guidelines which seek to regulate the activities of susu companies and other 
individual susu collectors (Bank of Ghana 2011).  
The regulation of these susu companies transformed the collection of savings from an informal activity to a 
formal one. Thus the classification of susu companies as one of the types of susu schemes by Steel and Andah 
(2003) is erroneous. This is because susu companies, which were in existence prior to the passage of the repealed 
Financial Institutions (Non-Banking) Act, 1993 (PNDCL 328) and the Non-Bank Financial Institutions Act, 
2008 (Act 774), were by virtue of their incorporation formal entities. Therefore, susu companies did not qualify 
as informal enterprises and should not be classified as part of susu schemes. As formal entities, they were subject 
to the regulatory regime and supervised by regulatory bodies. It is contended that the provision of a financial 
service, ordinarily recognised as informal, by a registered business does not in itself qualify the business or the 
service as an informal concern. The promulgation of the then PNDCL 328 (repealed) and subsequently Act 774, 
only reinforced the position that the act of incorporating an entity, that used informal means to provide micro 
financial services, takes away the cloak of informality and clothes the entity with formality.  
 
2. Group Savings Schemes 
2.1. Susu Associations 
Amongst the other forms of savings mobilisation schemes are susu associations which are usually group based 
and often formed for the mutual benefit of the group. Susu associations operate as either ROSCAs or 
accumulating savings and credit associations (ASCRAs). The practice of communal support in most African 
cultures, including Ghana, may have engineered the development of susu associations. Membership of this type 
of susu usually ranges between five and forty.  For instance, out of the total population of ROSCAs surveyed in 
Northern Ghana, 63% were found to have membership ranging from ten to twenty. Unlike susu collectors who 
are mostly men, leaders of ROSCAs as well as their membership are predominantly women. Most of these 
women engage in informal economic activities such as processing and marketing. In an overall sample of 
ROSCAs, 46% were found to be women in Ghana, with 57% and 80% in Tanzania and Nigeria respectively 
(Jones et al 2000; The World Bank Group 1997).  
Members of ROSCAs make regular fixed contributions, either weekly or monthly. The total sum contributed is 
given to each member in turn and in accordance with a procedure agreed upon by the members themselves (Steel 
and Andah 2000; Geertz 1962). All members of the group, except the last recipient, receive pooled savings 
earlier than if the member had saved that amount all alone. Most ROSCAs have a lifespan that runs with the 
number of the membership and the periodic frequency of contributions. A ROSCA might therefore come to an 
end after all members have received their share of contributions (Bouman 1994).  
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Ardener (1964) however, argues that the definition given to ROSCAs is often restrictive and does not cover all 
forms of ROSCAs found worldwide. For instance, it has been observed amongst ROSCAs in Keta, a town in 
Ghana, that contributions are not always fixed (Little 1957). Further, the whole contributed sum is not always 
given to members (Ardener 1953). The nature of ROSCAs as perceived by Geertz (1962) as well as Steel and 
Andah (2003) by the use of the word ‘sum’ appears to imply that contributions are only made in cash. Evidence 
from other communities including some Chinese and Japanese associations suggests that, contributions made by 
members can be partly cash and partly kind (Ardener 1964; Embree 1946).  
Unlike ROSCAs, members of the accumulating type make regular contributions but are not given to members in 
rotation. Contributions are instead lent to members under certain agreed terms. Whilst loans under ROSCAs are 
automatic, the grant of loans with ASCRAs are based on decisions of a board or with the consent of members 
and therefore not automatic. A member of an ASCRA could also benefit under the scheme in an emergency or 
upon the occasioning of an event such as death of a family member, marriage or payment of school fees or 
festivals (Steel and Andah 2003; Bouman 1994). Consequently, ASCRAs, which are also known as non-rotating 
susu, serve a different economic purpose. It provides a cheaper savings and credit facility to members. It offers 
low transaction costs and inexpensive safekeeping of savings, as well as an easy and flexible accessibility to loan 
funds made up of members’ savings.  
Similar to ROSCAs, ASCRAs operate on mutual trust and continuity of membership during an agreed 
contribution period. The associated risks of such group schemes are therefore borne by the group. The 
non-rotating susu group thus serves as an insurance scheme which protects members against risks associated 
with the system. In cases where a contributor ceases to be a member by reason of death or withdraws from the 
group or fails to settle any outstanding debt, the group shoulders any loss arising thereof. Contributing members 
then stand the risk of losing part of their savings (Aryeetey and Udry1995). Whilst ROSCAs involve no 
administrative work as loans are given automatically and upon each collection date, ASCRAs require some 
administration and transaction costs. This is because the process of granting and managing loans plus the 
provision of collateral in some cases require decision making and record keeping (Bouman 1994; Bouman 
1977). 
ROSCAs are known by different names in different countries. Unlike susu, which is more common in West 
Africa (Aryeetey and Udry 1995), ROSCAs are known worldwide and operate under different names. They are 
known as esusu in Nigeria and Sierra Leone, chilemba or chiperegani in Malawi, upatu or mchezo in Tanzania 
and tontiniers or tontines in francophone countries (The World Bank Group 1997; Aryeetey and Udry 1995; 
Bouman 1994; Burton 1865). It is commonly called osusu in some parts of Ghana (Martin, 1956).  In China the 
commonest types of ROSCAs are known as lun-hui, yao-hui and the piao-hui (Goh 1964). It is also known as 
bisi in Pakistan (Van der Horst 1974), ho in Vietnam and ko in Japan (Geertz 1962). In 1825, savings clubs, 
some of which operated in a rotating manner, were found in parts of Scotland and northern England under the 
name ménage (Ardener 1964; Jeffreys 1951). Similar saving associations were also found in some mining areas 
in England (Kuper and Kaplan 1944, cited in Ardener 1964). The belief that rotating savings associations existed 
in England or Scotland does not seem to find favour with Ardener (1964), as she observed that there does not 
seem to be evidence of any rotating activity in Europe.  Ardener’s (1964) view seems to carry some weight, as 
recent evidence suggests that even though some form of informal savings schemes exist in parts of England and 
Scotland, they do not operate in a rotating manner. An example of such schemes is the Christmas hampers 
scheme and Christmas clubs. 
 
2.1.1 Christmas Hampers  
The Christmas hamper scheme involves the deposit of savings which may serve as down payment for goods or 
vouchers at the end of the year. It appears users do not consciously use the scheme as a means of saving but with 
a retail mindset. The schemes are marketed at the local community level and by local agents known to the users 
either as friends or family. These agents receive about 2.5% of their collections as commission or up to 25% of 
the cost of a hamper (Opinion Leader 2007; Shaoul 2006). 
The Christmas hamper scheme provides a flexible and convenient means of saving which could be used for food 
and gifts, or adapted to suit family circumstance. Users enjoy the convenience of having agents collecting their 
deposits and delivering goods to their door steps. It also granted users some peace of mind knowing they could 
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avoid running into debt during Christmas. In spite of these benefits enjoyed by users, the hamper scheme is 
embedded with various risks such as the provision of poor value for money. The scheme also imposes 
restrictions on redemptions which are usually limited to certain shops where vouchers could be used. The nature 
of the hamper scheme makes it vulnerable to collapse (Opinion Leader 2007; BBC 2006). Its risky nature was 
made more evident by the collapse of Farepak savings club, where hundreds of thousands families lost their 
savings (Carrell 2006; Shaoul 2006; BBC 2006). Farepak operated with about 35,000 local agents who collected 
weekly contributions from savers.  
 
2.1.2 Christmas Clubs 
Similar to the Christmas hamper schemes in England and Scotland are Christmas clubs which are mainly 
operated by banks in the United States. These clubs have been found to have no officers, they hold no meetings, 
and have no mutual undertakings. Members of the club simply agree to deposit savings for a fifty week term 
with no access to their deposits until the end of the term. Some depositors save as little as 25 cents per week with 
$1 per week being more popular. Occasionally, others deposit as much as $20 per week. These deposits are 
usually evidenced by records of deposits made in coupon books, punch cards, or bank books.  
Unlike susu which is more common in rural and low income communities, Christmas clubs differ in procedure 
and form from other types of informal savings schemes such as the ROSCAs often found amongst immigrants in 
the United States (Light 1972).  
 
3.0 Micro-Credit in Parts of Asia 
Microfinance institutions, largely in developing countries, particularly Asia, have for some time now been 
engaged in the provision of micro-credit facilities to the poor as well as middle income earners. An example is 
the Green bank in the Philippines which expanded its and Gupta 1996; Jain 1996).services to include the regular 
door-to-door pick-up of cash from poor and low income households. The Grameen bank is also a classical 
example of a formal institution that has successfully engaged in microfinance activities through the provision of 
credit facilities to rural, poor and low income farmers and households in Bangladesh (Dowla and Barua2006; 
Morduch 1999; Rahman 1999; Hossain 1988; Goetz  
Even though most developing countries’ governments have failed to achieve any appreciable results in 
microfinance programs, the Grameen bank’s microfinance activities have proved fruitful. The bank’s activities in 
providing credit to the poor in Bangladesh have been described as a case of exceptional success. In 1994, it was 
reported that the bank’s micro-credit programs covered over 34,000 villages and supported about two million 
poor landless villagers in Bangladesh.  The Bank’s success has been attributed to its preference for quality 
service over subsidising the cost of credit facilities to the poor, who are mostly women. It seems the delivery of 
rural credit to the door steps of the poor and covering a large poor and rural area has been a major factor in its 
success story (Jain 1996; Grameen Dialogue 1994; Desai and Mellor 1993; Yaron 1992; Adams, Graham & Von 
Pischke 1984). 
The operations of these institutions are, however, significantly different from that of susu. Susu operates at the 
lower end of microfinance and is mostly engaged in by traditional deposit collectors using informal means to 
collect daily savings from poor and rural households, as well as low to middle income earners. Contrastingly, 
these institutions are formal organisations operating at the upper end of microfinance and within the semi-formal 
and formal segments of the financial sector. Notwithstanding their formal nature, semi-formal and formal banks 
such as the Green and Grameen banks provide micro-credit and savings facilities, using informal means and 
agents to pursue such micro-credit and other financial activities to the poor and rural communities (Ashraf et al 
2005; Basu, Blavy & Yulek 2004; Patten et al 2001; Seibel and Schrader 1999; Jain 1996). Unlike susu which is 
more common in rural and low income communities, microfinance activities occurring within the semi-formal 
and formal segments of the financial sector is accessible to all levels of income earners as well as small to 
medium size businesses (Microfinance Gateway 2009; Ashraf et al 2005 and Azam, Biais, Dia & Maurel 2001). 
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4.0 Microfinance in Africa 
In Africa, however, the definitional scope of microfinance extends over several operations including 
arrangements that deal only with certain categories of persons who meet specified and distinct criteria (Aryeetey 
1998).  Such informal arrangements falling under the definitional scope in Africa cover units grouped under 
three different categories. They comprise of savings mobilisation schemes that provide little or no credit 
facilities, credit schemes that hardly provide savings facilities and schemes providing both savings and lending 
facilities to its members (Aryeetey and Udry 1995). These informal financial practices usually occur in both 
urban and rural communities in Africa. In Senegal for instance, ROSCAs are predominant amongst market 
women as well as persons with regular incomes such as public employees, doctors or teachers. The spread of 
these traditional saving associations in Senegalese urban areas is in response to the deteriorating economy, 
banking crises, rapid urbanisation, rural-to-urban migration and the failure of the state to provide public services 
(Aryeetey and Udry 1995; Bouman 1994).  
These informal financial schemes existing in both villages and cities help pool funds to support community 
projects in the villages, as well as provide a mechanism for saving by migrant city dwellers (Dupuy 1991). For 
instance, the tontine in Francophone West Africa serves as a multifunctional financial phenomena functioning as 
ROSCAs, mutual aid, collective investment and community development schemes in villages. Tontines are 
diverse in nature and exist in different forms. Not all tontines perform all or the same functions. They operate in 
the form of insurance schemes, financial intermediaries, and promoters of community development projects in 
cities. More importantly they serve as a point of integration between rural and urban lifestyles (Bouman 1994).  
In Cameroon, the tontine plays four major roles in the lives of its members and the community as a whole. 
Firstly, it provides a social security fund for emergencies and life cycle events. This type of fund is made up of 
irregular ad hoc contributions made at the time of need to support such emergencies. Secondly, tontines operate 
as ROSCAs where contributions are collected for members in a rotating manner until each member receives their 
share. Thirdly, it functions as an ASCRA and grants loans with interest rates of about 10% per month. Fourthly, 
a tontine serves as a collective investment scheme where profits accrue to members (Laffite 1981; Bouman 
1994). The tontine, the esusu in Anglophone West Africa, the stokvel in South Africa and bishi in India are all 
collective names composed mainly of ROSCAs (Bouman 1994).    
Ghana’s informal financial practices are no different from the above. The operations of the sector evolve around 
susu, ROSCAs and ASCRAs. In addition to these savings and credit schemes, other financial activities occurring 
beyond financial regulations include trade creditors, self-help groups, personal loans from friends, relatives, 
neighbours and landlords (Steel &Andah 2003; Aryeetey1998; Aryeetey 1994). Informal financial activities exist 
in various forms, such as susu, ASCRAs and ROSCAs, and are purpose oriented. They develop to meet specific 
needs of particular communities, taking into consideration the peculiar socio-economic needs of that community 
(Aryeetey and Udry1995).  
5.0 Conclusion 
As a purpose oriented and dynamic financial activity susu is found in varying forms in both developed and 
developing countries. It is capable of meeting the socio-economic and communal needs of both rural and low 
income earners. Susu is also distinguished from other savings phenomenon by its individualistic approach 
towards savings. Whilst any arrangements in ROSCAs and ASCRAs are group based and members are bound by 
the rules of the group, any arrangement between a collector and saver in the case of susu is a personal one.  
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